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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a preliminary study of selected managerial communication prac-
tices in Chinese factories. Members of a delegation of Chinese managers visiting the United States 
were interviewed to explore: (a) the extent to which Chinese factories conform to a bureaucratic 
model of organization, and (b) factory director communication within these organization. Of partic-
ular interest were their upward and downward communication practices, and their methods for per-
suading and motivating workers and managing conflicts with problem employees. The results of 
our investigation reveal a distinctive form of bureaucracy operating within these factories. Moreover, 
we describe patterns of managerial communication practices that can be traced to cultural context, 
Chinese ideology, and organizational structure of the state-owned factory in mainland China. 
 
As organizations become more internationalized, cross-cultural and intercultural commu-
nication becomes increasingly relevant to organizational members and researchers (Stohl, 
1990). Currently, organizational and managerial communication research within Asian 
cultures focuses almost exclusively on the Japanese (e.g., Barnlund, 1989; Hirokawa & Mi-
yahara, 1986; Stewart, Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey, & Nishida, 1986). Management commu-
nication in mainland China, the world’s most populous country and arguably the most 
bureaucratic one, has yet to emerge as a sustained focus of study. 
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This is particularly ironic given the early evolution and importance of bureaucracy in 
traditional China for China has been described as “permanently Bureaucratic” (Balazs, 
1964). For centuries the best minds of the culture meditated on the problems of communi-
cation within the governmental hierarchy and between the people and the bureaucracy. 
As early as the fourth century B.C.E. Chinese political theorists were advising rulers to 
ensure that information flowed smoothly upward and downward, to minimize bias and 
falsification in sources, and to guard against the influence of cliques and opportunists. For 
example: 
 
In listening to reports and proposals, if you are too stern and severe and have no 
patience in guiding and drawing others out, then your subordinates will be fear-
ful and distant and will withdraw into themselves and be unwilling to speak. In 
such a case, important matters are likely to be left unattended and minor matters 
to be botched. If, however, you are too sympathetic and understanding, too fond 
of leading and drawing others out, and have no sense of where to stop, then men 
will come with all sorts of perverse suggestions and you will be flooded with 
dubious proposals. In such a case you will find yourself with too much to listen 
to and too much to do, and this also will be inimical to good government. (Hsun 
Tzu, c.260/1963, pp. 34–35) 
 
The immense, complex bureaucracy of China was one of the prime sources for Weber’s 
groundbreaking analysis of bureaucracy. Weber described bureaucracy as a form of social 
organization designed to maximize organizational efficiency and implement the principle 
of universalism. Through structures and processes such as task specialization, hierarchical 
authority, the development and maintenance of impersonal work relationships and the use 
of formal rules to guide and ensure rational action, bureaucracy in its ideal form lends 
predictability and efficiency to organizational behavior (Clegg, 1990). The extent to which 
this model applies to contemporary Chinese organizations of all stripes and the ways in 
which it shapes the resulting communication practices are questions worthy of additional 
study. 
Existing literature related to managerial communication in China falls into several cat-
egories. One body of literature focuses on the intercultural business encounter. These pub-
lications include recommendations for how to conduct oneself in business dealings with 
the Chinese (e.g., Chu, 1988; deKeijzer, 1986; Wall, 1990). A second type of literature fo-
cuses on the content and process of business communication instruction in mainland China 
(Zong & Hildebrandt, 1983; Halpern, 1983). A third type of related literature concerns com-
munication between factory managers and higher levels of the state system. With few ex-
ceptions (e.g., Hildebrandt, 1988), this research has been conducted by economists and 
political scientists whose primary interest is not in communication processes. 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the growing body of knowledge on work-
related communication in China by investigating internal, managerial communication 
practices in Chinese factories. Two overarching research questions guided our study: (a) 
to what extent do Chinese manufacturing organizations conform to a bureaucratic model 
of organization; and, (b) how does conformity to or divergence from this model relate to 
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managers’ communication practices with their employees? We were most interested in 
structures and processes related to vertical communication, persuading and motivating 




Managerial communication both affects and is affected by the larger cultural milieu. This 
section briefly discusses group-centeredness, Confucianism, Chinese Communism, and 
the relationship between family and work life in Chinese society. Then we briefly discuss 
the state-owned Chinese factory and the factory director responsibility system. 
 
Group-Centered Culture 
Traditional China was group-oriented, with the primary ties being those of kinship and 
close personal relations. The individual existed for the benefit of the group, group pressure 
was applied to ensure conformity through eliciting shame, and conflict was handled 
through intragroup mediation rather than an external legal system. This society was also 
characterized by paternalism, especially in the extended families. The elder males pro-
vided for the welfare of the group including such services as educating family members, 
arranging marriages, and determining members’ occupations. The contemporary Chinese 
remain a highly group-oriented people (Holfstede, 1986). Individuals derive their identity 
from groups and are expected to adopt group goals and opinions in exchange for protec-
tion and care. Socialization into Chinese culture fosters a strong sense of group identity so 
that individual achievement is presumed to be the result of group efforts and a source of 
group honor. Similarly, individual misconduct is a source of group shame because the 
group is presumed to have allowed it to happen. This group orientation also is reflected in 
the value placed upon acquiring knowledge concerning others in the group and expressing 
concern for one another in every respect. 
 
Confucianism 
Confucianism built on this system and was the official ideology underlying Chinese soci-
ety until the Communist Revolution of 1949. Retaining the paternalism and emphasis on 
kinship ties, Confucianism added a broader commitment to the harmonious operation and 
welfare of the entire society, a society conceived as inherently hierarchical. This was to be 
achieved by inculcating two cardinal virtues, “humaneness” (jen), and “correct behavior” 
(li), the second entailing that everyone conformed to the principles of behavior appropriate 
to his or her social role in life. Confucians placed great faith in education. Those who be-
haved badly because they disagreed with or were unaware of Confucian premises were 
not threatened or punished except as a last resort. Instead, they were subjected to the trans-
forming power of education and the equally powerful, though indirect, influence of good 
models of thinking and behaving. Protest, dissent, and criticism were appropriate only 
when the authorities themselves had inadvertently deviated from the principles of good 
government. Indeed, those in power were expected to be sensitive to expressions of dis-
content. But questioning of the system itself was forbidden. A recent conceptualization of 
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leadership in China reveals the persistence of Confucian values by including the dimen-
sion of moral character (Ling, 1989). 
 
Chinese Communism 
Chinese Communism, a form of socialist ideology, reflects many aspects of these two social 
influences. Though the ties of kinship are considerably weakened, the prevailing orienta-
tion is still toward the group: one’s work unit, the factory, or the state itself. The good 
Communist is concerned with the welfare of the whole, not with personal loss or gain. The 
state and all its properties are collectively owned by the people, and everyone strives (at 
least in theory) to serve the people. At the same time, people take for granted that the state, 
as represented by the work unit, should provide for their families and look after their well-
being by continuing to employ them regardless of their efforts. The doctrines of the party 
are assumed to be beyond question, and dissent is limited to calls for reform not revolution. 
The faith in education remains as strong as ever, though it is now labeled “ideological 
education,” that is, education in the principles of socialism. As before, the assumption is 
that once the truth has been placed before an individual, the scales will fall from his or her 
eyes. And the use of group pressure and shame to compel conformity lives on in such 
techniques of social control as the public “self-criticism” sessions. 
 
Family and Modern Work Life 
These cultural traditions persist in the modern relationships between family and work life. 
Many individual benefits and necessities are provided through the workplace. Workers 
live on plant grounds, and three generations from one family may be employed at the fac-
tory, a variation on the traditional description of the fortunate Chinese household as one 
with “three generations under one roof.” The larger the factory, the greater the range of 
services it will provide: education, housing, meals, medical care, jobs for children of work-
ers, assistance with emergencies, arrangement of marriages, and intervention on the 
worker’s behalf in legal and administrative problems (Walder, 1989). It also has the power 
to grant or deny workers’ requests to have children. These services are either unavailable 
elsewhere or are scarce and expensive, making the worker very dependent on the factory. 
Thus, although people are affiliated with a variety of organizations, the most significant 
one is each person’s work unit. In some ways, managers of the work units function as 
parents of a big family. Not only are they responsible for succeeding in business, they also 
become involved in finding solutions to employees’ personal problems (Wall, 1990). When 
an employee has a personal problem that directly affects his or her work performance, it 
reflects negatively on a work unit that may not have cared enough to assist him or her. 
This continuity between work and private life is reflected in what constitutes a “good” 
worker as well: An individual must perform well on the job and be trouble-free in his or 
her personal life. 
 
Factory Directory Responsibility System 
Beginning in 1949, when the Peoples’ Republic of China was founded, a tripartite socialist 
structure governed the workplace. This structure consisted of the Communist Party, busi-
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ness management, and the workers’ union. From 1949 to 1979, the party was the most in-
fluential of the three. Policies and practices emphasized ideological purification at the expense 
of production. However, the social reform which began in 1979 inspired unprecedented 
enthusiasm about productivity. A “factory director responsibility system” was instituted 
in almost all factories. This system officially required factory directors to coordinate the 
party, business management, and the workers’ union. The party is in charge of political 
ideology and represents management directly, addressing issues such as morale and mo-
bilization of the masses. Business management includes responsibility for such functions 
as production, technology, sales, and marketing. The union represents the workers’ inter-
ests directly, gathering their opinions and addressing issues of importance to them. These 
issues mainly concern the distribution of welfare and housing, but the union may also so-
licit ideas for improvement in plant management and innovations in technology (Warner, 
1991). Thus, for the first time in almost 40 years, management has full responsibility for 
production in the factories, at least in theory. 
While party organizations hold much less formal power than before in the management 
of the factory (Chamberlain, 1987), the amount of informal influence the party has from 
one factory to the next is quite variable. The party still has the right to be consulted on or 
approve appointments that a director makes to his staff, and it may have formal authority 
to lead the union director’s practices to make sure that policies and regulations are being 
followed and that the workers’ opinions are being considered. Managers may also rely on 
the party to assist them in “educating” workers to hold the proper attitude toward their 
work (Chamberlain, 1987; Walder, 1989). At a minimum, a factory director strives to main-
tain a harmonious relationship with the party (Walder, 1989). 
 
Procedures and Method 
 
In order to address our research questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted. 
We took extensive interview notes and analyzed them for emerging concepts and themes 
using the principles of the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We used 
this data collection procedure and analytic method to avoid certain methodological pit-
falls. Most generally, we were concerned about whether the questions we asked would be 
meaningful in another culture. The paucity of research on managerial communication in 
China made us especially wary of imposing constructs from one culture onto another, and 
operating on unexamined assumptions about cultural values, interpersonal relationships, 
and social structures (Limaye & Victor, 1991; Triandis & Albert, 1987). Research on Asians 
by foreigners is especially liable to the bias Edward Said (1978) has labeled “Orientalism,” 
including the assumption that all Orientals are alike. The use of semistructured interviews 
controls for this bias by permitting uniqueness as well as similarity among managers to 
emerge. Semistructured interviews also permit feedback that allows immediate correction 
of misunderstandings and adjustment of culturally based presuppositions. A respondent’s 
refusal to answer a question, his or her recasting of it, the tone and expression that modify 
the content of an answer, the unsolicited, surprising comment—all can be used to clarify 
question answer exchanges. 
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The Managers and Their Factories 
Interviews were conducted with ten high-level manufacturing executives from various ar-
eas of the People’s Republic of China. These executives were part of a trade delegation 
headquartered in Columbus, Ohio during January and February, 1990. Cosponsored by 
the Sino/Ohio Center and the Chinese State Council of Mechanical and Electrical Products, 
the visit was designed to allow managers to participate in business meetings with central 
Ohio companies. 
Since the entire delegation (with the exception of the Chinese interpreter) was male, all 
ten managers were male. Their official titles varied. Some managers listed as many as four 
titles, including manager, factory directory, deputy director, vice director, and even one 
“supreme” deputy director. Most were university graduates with technical backgrounds 
in areas such as engineering and economics. The managers had held their positions for 
three to twelve years and were responsible for factories that manufactured a variety of 
small electronic and machine products. The factories ranged in size from 340 to 3,200 work-
ers. Occasionally, when we asked about organizational size, a manager would give us two 
figures, one that excluded and one that included the family members of the workers. 
 
The Interviewers 
Three individuals planned and conducted each interview. All are professors of communi-
cation. One is a native of mainland China and speaks both Chinese and English. Another 
reads modern and classical Chinese, studies Chinese rhetoric, and lived and studied in 
Taiwan for one year. The third has expertise in organizational communication and inter-
viewing. Thus our group had a range of familiarity with organizational communication 
and Chinese culture that proved useful in the questioning process. Each interview was 
conducted with the assistance of the delegation’s official interpreter, an employee of the 
State Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
The Interview Process 
The interviewers prepared an interview opening, a general outline of topics and tentative 
questions related to the structure and operation of the managers’ factories and of the com-
munication practices within the factories. Interviews were scheduled from between 7:00 
p.m. and 10:00 p.m. during the week since managers were committed to other meetings 
throughout the day and on weekends. All interviews took place in the lounge areas of the 
apartment complex where the delegation resided. After exchanging business cards and 
introductions, the interpreter presented our prepared opening which included an expla-
nation of our results, an explanation of their right to resist answering particular questions, 
and an invitation for any questions about the interview or its procedures (Gorden, 1980). 
Because a semistructured interview approach was used, the length of each interview var-
ied from one to two hours. 
Our early interview experience led us to make several revisions. Over time, we were 
able to identify those questions that elicited nearly identical responses from managers, 
such as “Describe how your organization is structured.” While highly reliable (Kirk & Mil-
ler, 1986), these questions yielded little new information; thus we devoted increasingly less 
time to them. Instead of asking bluntly about disagreements or conflicts at work and how 
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they are managed, we learned to ask managers to describe what they considered to be one 
instance of a “problem” employee and then to outline the steps they would take to deal 
with such an individual. Abstract questions related to organizational stability such as 
“How much change occurs in your plant?” grew increasingly concrete: for example, “What 
is your greatest worry?” We appear to have created a relaxed and informal atmosphere. 
Respondents felt free to laugh at some of our questions and some even joked with us near 
the end of the interviews, asking us questions like “Why do they [American managers] 
want all of that money?” and “What do they do with it?” (#9). 
 
Data Analysis 
Once the interviews were completed, interview notes were copied and exchanged. We in-
dividually analyzed the set of notes for recurring concepts and themes related to our re-
search questions. In doing so, we looked for similarities and areas of uniqueness within 
the responses to our questions. When necessary, we discussed our impressions of the data 
until consensus emerged on the patterns we were seeing in the responses. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Because traditional China has been characterized as a heavily bureaucratized society, one 
of our principal interests was to examine the extent to which a rational-legal model exists 
in manufacturing organizations. In the following two sections, we discuss managers’ re-
sponses concerning how their factories conform to and diverge from the bureaucratic ideal. 
 
Bureaucratic Structures and Processes 
Ways in which these factories conformed to the bureaucratic ideal include the use of 
formal information centers, centralized authority structures, and the establishment and 
use of performance-reward contingencies. 
 
Formal Information Centers 
Consistent with a bureaucratic form of organization, two managers explicitly discussed 
the presence and use of formal “information centers” (#5, #7). As one manager described 
it, “Information centers are common in state factories, less common in the provinces.” (The 
greater the production capacity, the more important the product to the national economy 
and the more advanced the technology, the more likely it is to be a state factory.) Technical, 
production, and personnel information is catalogued and saved including written records 
of reports presented at meetings, weekly and monthly quality reports, customers’ letters 
concerning the factory’s products, and market surveys. “In each production unit, we have 
people gather this information, sort it and send it to the information center. It’s open to 
everyone, except the personnel files” (#5). Personnel files are less accessible because they 
contain confidential information on each worker, such as his or her political orientation. 
 
Centralized Authority 
Centralization of authority was evident in managers’ description of how they made deci-
sions and implemented their ideas. One manager stated that he would rather be a manager 
K R O N E ,  G A R R E T T ,  A N D  C H E N ,  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  J .  O F  B U S I N E S S  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  2 9  ( 1 9 9 2 )  
8 
than a worker because “I can put my ideas and concepts into practice . . . workers have 
fewer autonomous rights” (#5). This same manager, when talking about what he does 
when he has an idea for a change in the factory, indicated that if he wants a large invest-
ment, he talks with the director and the other deputy directors about it. When asked if he 
would include the workers’ union, he acknowledged that he might meet with their repre-
sentatives, but then he said, “If they don’t like it, we will still do it” (#5). 
When asked to describe a managerial plan he had fulfilled, another manager said “I 
reorganized . . . simplified the management staff. I had 150 [managers and supervisors]. I 
sent 25 to the workshops. Management is working better, people in the workshop are 
working better” (#1). The same manager alluded to the ultimate authority of the deputy 
directors and the director in problem solving when he said, 
 
Disagreements are very rare. If they happen it is because people are looking at 
things from different angles. We will discuss and exchange ideas, but in the end, 
they listen to me [a deputy director], and I listen to the director. Sometimes I’m 
right and sometimes I’m wrong. If I’m wrong, I change my mind. (#1) 
 
He went on to say that when he is wrong, he publicly criticizes himself, usually in a meet-
ing, in order to improve himself. While public self-criticism following incorrect decision 
making diverges from a rational-legal model of organization, making important strategic 
decisions only at the highest levels of authority conforms to such a model. 
 
Performance-Reward Contingencies 
A final way in which these factories seemed to conform to the bureaucratic ideal was in 
the link that managers tried to establish and maintain between worker performance and 
rewards (#1, #2, #6, #8). One manager said “Those who work well get more financial re-
wards than those who don’t. If they exceed their quotas and have high quality, they get 
rewarded” (#8). He went on to say that he gives “spiritual encouragement” first, financial 
incentives second. “Spiritual encouragement” involves selecting someone as a model 
worker, putting his or her name and photo in a gallery, and sending him or her red flowers. 
After this, he gives financial rewards to high performers. He also indicated that he has a 3 
to 5 percent “promotion right” under his control. Another manager said “I don’t grant job 
transfer requests because we need the workers where they are. I tell them ‘someone has to 
do it. You agreed to do it. You have been rewarded for it.’ [Instead] I try to improve their 
condition, give them more benefits” (#2). For him, this meant that someone who did dirty, 
heavy work would be issued more than one bar of soap. 
 
Nonbureaucratic Structures and Processes 
How Chinese factories diverge from a bureaucratic ideal became clear as these managers 
described their far-ranging duties, discrepancies between their assigned levels of respon-
sibility and authority (primarily with respect to personnel management), and competing 
sources of authority. 
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Ill-defined Duties 
Throughout the interviews, the managers revealed that the position of “factory director” 
has no well-defined limits. Indeed, the diversity and burden of their responsibilities was a 
common complaint among them. As one manager said, “The factory takes care of workers 
until their death. It provides housing, enforces birth control quotas, and manages quarrels 
between spouses” (#10). Four managers described how their work is affected by having 
administrative responsibility for assigning and maintaining workers’ housing (#1, #2, #8, 
#10). They noted that they or their delegates often must hear and manage workers’ requests 
for more space (#1) or complaints about inadequate fuel and utilities in the residential areas 
(#2, #8). Apparently, a number of factory directors or their delegates oversee a “Depend-
ents Committee” that consists of family members of the workers (#2). Two managers ex-
plicitly mentioned their responsibility for enforcing government control policies (#8, #10). 
If a factory “overproduces,” the couple, the factory, and the manager can all be penalized; 
at the same time, the manager is the ultimate target for workers’ requests for a child. As 
one manger put it, 
 
The factory signs a contract with childbearing women. The district gives the fac-
tory a quota for a given period of time. It decides who gets to have children that 
year. Individuals are punished if they overproduce. The factory is too. They can 
be disqualified from various competitions. I [the factory director] would be 
fined. The violators would also be fined—both the man and the woman. The man 
might not get rewards or be promoted. (#8) 
 
This same manager summarized his varied duties by saying “The factory is like a small 
city” (#8). 
Although these managers complained about their range of responsibilities, they did not 
describe what other sources have revealed to be one of their most effective strategies for 
coping with them. As Walder has noted (1989), managers often deal with the day-to-day 
pressure from workers for favors by diverting resources earmarked for other purposes to 
employee benefits—bonuses, new housing, better food, or new clothes, a feat often 
achieved through double-bookkeeping. Since such diversions are known to be illegal, the 
managers’ silence is not surprising. Perhaps seeing himself as the exception to this wide-
spread practice, one manager brought up a case in which he refused to behave in this way 
despite worker appeals. He did not rescind a medical tax, defending his action on the 
grounds that the plant needed to balance its books (#3). 
 
Responsibility-Authority Discrepancies 
A second way in which the factories diverged from the bureaucratic ideal was the extent 
to which factory directors’ responsibilities for personnel management exceeded their for-
mal authority. In general, managers described situations in which they struggle to meet 
quotas without having the authority to discipline or fire workers. More specifically, the 
main reason they felt that “personnel management is the biggest headache” (#8) was the 
difficulty of firing a worker. The manager who decides to fire a worker has embarked on 
a complicated, drawn-out affair that involves the workers’ union, all the employees, layers 
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of mediation, and appeals procedures. One director observed that a manager’s job is much 
easier in the United States precisely because of the power to fire (#8). Some managers also 
alluded to their limited ability to promote workers or reward them financially. In addition, 
one acknowledged problems in overseeing and evaluation administrators (that is, section 
chiefs and supervisors) by saying “In China, the workers are rewarded by piece-rate, but 
administrators are hard to control because it’s hard to divide up the responsibilities and 
account for results with administrators/section chiefs” (#10). 
Although the managers did not mention it as a problem, they did note that individuals 
are commonly appointed to a job, often against their wishes and often for life. This was 
even true of some of our interviewees. One hapless manager, who said that he was inter-
ested in technical matters, not management, had refused the appointment several times, 
all to no avail, and was still not reconciled to the situation (#9). He expressed his sentiments 
this way: “I would rather be a director than a floor worker, but being a director isn’t easy. 
It’s so troublesome. My interest is in technical matters, not management. I was appointed 
to the director’s job” (#9). Another was more philosophical as he described his situation: 
“The State has educated me, so I owe it to the State to fill the job” (#6). 
 
Competing Sources of Authority 
Our interviews make clear that the Chinese Communist Party is a potentially competing 
source of authority in the factories. The managers’ attitudes concerning their relationship 
to the party varied. Some saw the party as providing welcome managerial assistance, oth-
ers reported that they felt monitored by it, still others were reticent in discussing their 
views. When the party was valued, it was not so much for its overarching ideological lead-
ership as for its aid in helping managers to implement specific policies within the plant. 
For instance, one manager said “The party assists the director in managing the factory, by 
educating the staff, supporting the director . . . Party members might educate workers who 
are having difficulty implementing the yearly plans by saying ‘Don’t complain, work 
harder’” (#4). Other managers seemed to keep the party at more of a distance, perhaps 
because, as one manager noted, the party has a legal responsibility to turn in a manager if 
he breaks the law. More specifically, he indicated that “The party secretary will give me 
warnings if I am violating state laws and regulations. If the warnings go unheeded, the 
party secretary can report me to the government” (#7). The same manager had formed a 
coterie of advisors, the “intelligent group,” in which the party did not participate. Another 
manager, when asked how many people were under him, replied dryly that it was hard to 
say, because he wasn’t sure if the party was under him (#6). Another described the party’s 
role as that of “coordinator.” When asked “of what?” he simply dismissed the subject by 
saying, “It’s hard to say,” a standard Chinese way of politely dropping a subject (#9). Fi-
nally, some managers did not even mention the party unless asked directly about it. The 
variation in managers’ relationships with the party, as well as some managers’ attempts to 
keep it at a distance or even shut it out entirely, no doubt reflect fundamental tension cre-
ated by the socialist structure. It appears to be an ongoing and irresolvable problem. 
A similar range existed in the managers’ interpretations of Chinese Communist shibbo-
leths. One defined “socialism” as follows: “Business organizations follow a socialist ideol-
ogy; they exist to build up the economy in China” (#2). Another said, “You should get 
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[according to] what you have done; the more you do, the more you’ll get. . . . Workers will 
be better off only if the factory is developing well. [You] can judge a factory by how well 
the workers are doing in benefits” (#4). Another put a similarly capitalist twist on the no-
tion of “ideological education”: “you tell them to work better so they’ll get more money” 
(#1). This range of interpretations of party-sanctioned terms whose connotations and uses 
often shift abruptly even in official discourse, may in part be creative misinterpretations to 
sanction an approach the individual manager prefers to adopt without having to fight a 
frontal battle against the party line. The variation in how managers relate to the party and 
interpret party-sanctioned terms are rational responses to what are arguably irrational 
structures and processes. 
The overlapping functions between the party and management create ambiguous lines 
of authority. Both represent management to the workers and try to maintain high morale. 
Both are involved in setting policy, and both are responsible for the results. To complicate 
matters further, the relationship between the party and management can vary according 
to political shifts and the personalities of particular factory and party officials. Because the 
party represents the current line of accepted thought, it can demand that factory procedure 
be adjusted to follow the many changes in the political winds, rather than being responsive 
to economic factors. For instance, after the Tiannamen Square tragedy, the party attempted 
to assert its authority, stating that “only if the party members in enterprises [such as facto-
ries] give full play to their role as the ‘fighting bastion’ and party members play an exem-
plary role can the party’s line, principles and policies be thoroughly carried out” (FBIS 
Daily Report, 12/29/89, pp. 4–6). 
To recapitulate, these interviews offer insights on the extent to which the structure and 
procedures of these factories correspond to and diverge from Weber’s notion of rational 
bureaucracy. On the one hand, the managers referred to conforming elements such as the 
use of formal information centers, centralized decision making, and performance reward 
contingencies. However, in a number of key respects, these managers revealed how their 
factories diverge from Weber’s bureaucratic ideal. Managers must meet quotas under con-
ditions of extremely limited power so that they struggle to fulfill their job duties. As a rule, 
their extremely limited ability to reward or punish, to hire or fire constrains their attempts 
to ensure efficient worker performance. Assigning individuals to jobs (often for life) for 
which they have little or no training or interest compounds the problem and runs contrary 
to the careerization that marks bureaucracy as an ideal type. The paternalism under which 
managers control and are responsible for almost every aspect of workers’ lives means that, 
in reality, their jobs have no well-defined limits, and that they relate much more personally 
with workers than a bureaucratic model would prescribe. Last, the overlapping functions 
between the party and management sometimes confuses lines of authority. Thus, we con-
clude along with others (S. G. Redding, 1990; Walder, 1986; Yang, 1959) that a special form 
of bureaucracy seems to operate in Chinese factories. 
 
Managerial Communication Practices 
In this section we discuss managers’ descriptions of general upward and downward com-
munication practices in their factories, how they persuade and motivate workers and man-
age employee conflicts. We will concentrate on the extent to which these practices reflect 
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In general, these managers acknowledged that communication and interpersonal relation-
ships were very important to them in their jobs. Even if employees do not wish to com-
municate their feelings and desires, they must be “encouraged” to do so; managers, in turn, 
must be “thick-skinned” and persistent in their communication attempts even when others 
may not want to talk with them (#10). Another manager emphasized the importance of lis-
tening to effective communication when he said “if communication is stuck, it means 
you’ve lost your ears” (#9). This same manager remarked that communication is important 
not only in the work but also in the very subtle process of creating personal relationships 
with people. 
These managers described the use of several formal means of upward and downward 
communication in their factories. In order to provide opportunities for upward communica-
tion, some managers made themselves quite available during working hours. One made 
himself too available perhaps, allowing himself to be hounded by employees seeking fa-
vors to the point that they burst into his office at any time, followed him home, cursing 
him all the way, and even intruded on his dinner (#10). More consistent with the bureau-
cratic ideal, however, many managers created formal avenues for upward communication. 
These managers insisted on clear lines of communication; delegated authority, often to 
committees; and restricted access, holding open hours only at specified times. One indi-
cated the he gets opinions of the people from the workers’ union, remarking that in this 
way the people “go through ‘ladders’ up to me” (#2). This same manager indicated that he 
also sets aside a half day each week when the people can come to him to voice their prob-
lems directly. Other managers revealed their reliance on a chain of command in managing 
workers’ problems. One said that “any visit or talk is welcome, but I can’t solve all prob-
lems, so I send them to the appropriate department” (#6). Another manager said that for 
women who will not accept that they cannot have a child, “First they would have to speak 
to an official in the birth control office. Usually, I won’t get involved in it” (#8). Two man-
agers referred to use of factory or union committees to screen workers’ suggestions for 
improvements (#3, #6). One of these said, “Under the union there is a committee that hears 
ideas on management. The committee discusses it. If the idea is reasonable, they put the 
suggestion in writing to me, asking for permission to change” (#3). Another manager uses 
a “Director’s Letter Box,” where “workers can write letters to complain or propose im-
provements in the factory. Some use this to complain about personal problems with hous-
ing, or children’s arrangements or to tell on someone who is not doing their job” (#8). This 
manager opens the box weekly and receives an average of 1 to 2 letters each week. 
Managers also discussed using a range of formal methods for communication downward 
with employees. Almost all managers hold regularly scheduled and unscheduled meetings 
with various groups of employees (#1, #2, #3, #6, #8, #9, #10). Some managers restricted 
themselves to formal periodic reports to workers’ committees or assemblies while others 
supplemented these formal practices with informal visits within the plant. At one extreme, 
however, is a manager who seemed extraordinarily sensitive to the need for managerial 
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communication. This manager made himself very visible in the plant. He videotaped his 
speeches to workers and scheduled them before showings of popular films at the plant, 
took daily walks through the factory, greeted workers at the factory gate in the morning, 
and spoke with the deputy directory of production every day (#7). This same manager also 
alluded to the use of “ladders” to communicate downward in his factory when he said “I 
use the workers’ union to tell the people of my plans because there are too many people to 
communicate with directly.” 
Three managers drew some distinction between formal and informal downward com-
munication. These managers mentioned that formal warnings were issued to workers who 
had made serious mistakes or who had ongoing records of poor performance, while less 
serious offenses were handled through the use of informal conversations (#2, #4, #5). While 
most managers focused their comments on formal upward and downward communica-
tion, one manager explicitly described the presence and uniqueness of informal communi-
cation in the factory when he said “Good things stay behind closed doors; bad things travel 
thousands of miles” (#3). According to this manager, “bad things” included gossip about 
others’ sexual and personal habits, theft, or “poor moral fiber.” 
 
Persuading and Motivating Workers 
Managers described themselves as relying heavily on persuasion when seeking adherence 
to policies (#2, #4, #5, #6). Several managers reported explaining new policies and decisions 
to workers in detail. Assuming the correctness of his position, one manager explained that 
“it may happen that my decision isn’t popular. This is because I didn’t explain it enough, 
so I will wait so they can understand it and will explain it more” (#6). Most said they strive 
for consensus, though they will proceed without it if they feel workers will eventually see 
the value of the changes. Several managers described the party and the workers’ union as 
playing a significant part in this persuasive process. Once a policy has been agreed upon, 
party and union members interpret and defend it to the workers, and relay worker con-
cerns back to management (#2, #4, #5, #6). Specifically, one manager said: 
 
If we want to carry out new rules, we’ll ask them [the workers’ union] for help 
in explaining it to workers. These rules are good for workers. For example, “no 
smoking” in the workshop . . . yes, the workers are sometimes unhappy so we 
have to explain it. We could be fined up to 40 yuan [principal Chinese unit of 
currency] for violations. I will get a higher fine—120 yuan. (#5) 
 
He added that if the factory inspectors don’t report violations, the workers can report both 
the inspector and the factory director. 
The managers reported using both direct and indirect strategies to motivate workers. 
One manager tried to get the best from his workers by “working from their strengths” and 
conveying the message that he is responsible for their failures, while the workers are re-
sponsible for their successes (#9). He added that “even a poor worker has strong points.” 
Another manager said that he tells workers to “Try to relate their important personal in-
terests and concerns with their work attitudes and performance” (#6). Most managers, 
however, used more direct techniques that often involved promising a range of material 
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and “spiritual” rewards. One manager said that he simply tells workers “to work harder, 
and get training, to get a better bonus” (#1). Another manager created “Competition Cam-
paigns.” He explained that those who did poorly would suffer loss of self-esteem in front 
of their fellow workers, and their parents would grill them on why they were not doing 
well in the competition (#6). Other managers appealed to the workers’ sense of duty to the 
factory and the society by saying things like “Work harder. The people/factory will never 
forget what you have done” (#8). Another manager, who was part of an experiment on 
factory management, said that he motivates workers through the use of a wage distribu-
tion system and with the help of the union. The union representatives communicate with 
the workers and “get them to accept my plan so they’ll do the work willingly” (#7). As was 
mentioned in our discussion of performance reward contingencies, four managers dis-
cussed using strategies such as awarding outstanding workers with certificates, flowers, 
and other marks of distinction (such as a nominal bonus), as well as singling them out by 
name for praise during speeches (#1, #2, #6, #8). Most typically, “spiritual” encouragement 
and inspiration are given more frequently and freely than are material rewards. 
 
Managing Conflicts with Workers 
Conflict resolution is another area in which communication played an important role. 
When asked to give examples of “problem” workers and to describe the steps that they 
would take in dealing with such workers, many managers described complaining workers. 
Most managers said that when workers complain they try to find out if the complaints are 
valid. “Maybe they’re having a job problem or a personal problem” (#5, #6). One of these 
managers went on to say “We have to find out the cause behind it [the bad attitude]. If he 
intentionally caused trouble, he will be punished according to the regulations. I won’t di-
rectly involve myself. Managers under me will deal with it” (#5). Complaining in and of 
itself, however, was not always seen as requiring intervention. One manager, when pushed 
on this point, stated that an unhappy worker would be permitted to continue venting his 
grievances as long as he did not act on them (#2). As other managers quite reasonably 
observed, “complaints aren’t always bad” (#5, #6). The relatively high tolerance for worker 
complaints that some of these managers expressed differs from the accounts of Walder’s 
interviewees, who described a terrorized and demoralized work force afraid to utter the 
smallest protest (Walder, 1986). The difference may reflect the greater liberalization of the 
post–Cultural Revolution atmosphere. If managers are not able to make the improvements 
that workers demand, allowing them to blow off steam may be an adaptive response. 
Beyond handling complaining workers, managers described conflicts over coming late 
to work, failing to meet production deadlines, stealing from the enterprise, and such (from 
the Chinese view) disruptive, selfish, and antisocial activities as quarreling with family 
members or gambling (#2, #4, #5). Similar to the management of complaining workers, the 
first step in resolving these conflicts was to determine why the behavior was going on (#5, 
#6). If there was no good reason, the next step would be “ideological education.” Since 
China is a socialist country and all workers are, by working for the factory, also working 
for the country, apathetic performance or antisocial behaviors can only be because the in-
dividual does not understand his or her duties. As one manager put it, because the factory 
makes welfare better for the workers, “Workers should be loyal to the factory. Their minds 
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and hearts should be on their work” (#2). Another said: “Quality problems are mainly due 
to the workers’ lack of responsibility, so everyone will educate the workers” (#5). Another 
said that he tries to inspire in workers the spirit of a true “owner of the nation” [and there-
fore, the factory], suggesting that they should be behaving in a more responsible and dig-
nified fashion (#8). The party and union members all may get involved “to raise a worker’s 
consciousness” (#5) concerning his or her poor performance. In theory, as soon as the in-
dividual is reminded of his or her responsibilities, his or her attitude should improve and 
the problem should disappear (#5, #6, #8). 
As was suggested earlier, “ideological education” or simply, “education” turned out to 
be a mixture of cajoling, threats, and promise of reward. One manager translated “giving 
education” into “tell them to work better so they will get more money” (#1). Another ex-
plained the process this way: “You find out why he’s doing it and explain why he can’t do 
it that way” (#4). As one manager put it, if the worker’s direct supervisor was unable to 
induce the worker to correct his errors, he himself would: (a) criticize the worker, (b) en-
courage him by pointing out that “if you change this behavior, you’ll be a good worker, 
and if you do in time, you won’t be docked,” and if this fails, (c) threaten him with firing 
(#3). 
Should this not work, the problem worker’s coworkers, friends, and family are often 
enlisted to intensify the “education.” One manager, for instance, said he would “send the 
workers union to ask the family to help change him,” and ask them to discuss with the 
worker the “error of his ways” (#4). Three managers said they would ask friends to talk to 
the problem worker (#4, #6, #9). When asked what these friends might say, one manager 
replied that they would have “heart-to-heart” talks in which the friend would help the 
worker see “the consequences of his actions and that it’s not honorable to create family 
problems” (#4). They will “exchange views” and “the friends will correct his bad views” 
(#4). Four managers mentioned using a similar process to settle workers’ marital quarrels 
(#4, #5, #9, #10). Threats, penalties, and other coercive measures were always considered 
an unhappy last resort. 
However, for a few managers ideological education seemed to be an empty gesture, or 
even a process they no longer used. Several did not mention it at all when describing steps 
taken to deal with problem workers. And when we asked one of these managers about it 
directly, he replied, “of course, ideological education comes first,” but he was not inter-
ested in discussing it any further. 
To sum up, many significant aspects of managerial communication in these factories 
can be attributed to the distinctive operating style of Chinese socialist bureaucracy and to 
the larger societal or cultural context. The paternalistic role assumed by managers means 
that they must walk a fine line in communication with workers. On the one hand, they 
need reliable information about workers’ welfare, lest deteriorating conditions lead to 
worker slowdown, absenteeism, and shoddy performance. On the other hand, they must 
ensure that they are not deluged by the requests of desperate workers, spouses, and rela-
tives. The attempts by managers to construct official channels of communication for 
worker requests and complaints is characteristic of rational bureaucracies. However, given 
the breadth and seriousness of worker needs, such structural solutions can never be ade-
quate and managers systems further from the bureaucratic ideal. As one manager put it “I 
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tell the workers ‘Don’t come in during office hours. I have to take care of production.’ I direct 
them to deputies, but they insist on seeing me saying ‘You’ll make the decision’” (#l0). 
According to socialist theory, managers must take workers’ opinions into account and 
build on workers’ support. In practice managers need worker assent to new policies as 
well as ongoing cooperation with existing ones because managers have few other means 
to ensure worker cooperation. Under such conditions their great interest in maintaining 
open communication channels with workers and in persuading them to comply is quite 
natural, as is the common practice of enlisting the party and the union to assist with such 
persuasive campaigns. This is, however, unilateral persuasion from a position of superior-
ity and certainty rather than a dialogue, a stance which is consistent with the models of 
persuasion-as-teaching in both Confucianism and Chinese socialism. 
These restrictions on managers also result in motivation strategies that boil down to 
praise and symbolic tokens of distinction. Even though managers may personally doubt 
the effectiveness of “ideological education” to correct poor performance and other worker 
shortcomings, its practice is closely tied to socialist ideology and the Chinese cultural con-
text, as well as reflecting again the restrictions on managers’ power of managing employ-
ees. It has deep roots in a culture that has great optimism about the individual’s ability to 
improve and in education’s capability to bring this about. The automatic inclusion of kin 
and friends in this process, the group pressure, and the appeals to honor and shame are all 
rooted in traditional Chinese methods of conflict resolution. They are, of course, the oppo-
site of the impersonal, legalist procedures that typify a rational bureaucracy. 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
Our findings reveal how factory directors in China rely on oral communication to ex-
change information, motivate and confront problem workers. They differ somewhat from 
those of Hildebrandt (1988) whose survey results showed that PRC managers use much 
more written communication than oral, and that they do not see communication and per-
suasion as areas of concern. The differences most likely reflect the types of research ques-
tions addressed. Hildebrandt was concerned with communication between managers and 
the many levels of bureaucracy above them, extending all the way to the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party. Managers and workers alike may normally have little leeway 
for arguing with directives sent down through the official channels, and they may pru-
dently choose evasion, creative misunderstanding, or simple noncompliance with policies 
they find distasteful. However, at the factory level the manager does have some latitude 
in implementing policy and also can be pressured into change. For example, he can requi-
sition extra soap for those doing especially dirty work—and the workers can respond ac-
cordingly and wrangle with him for favors to which they feel entitled. 
Since so little research exists on internal, managerial communication in China, we be-
lieve that the present results, though preliminary are quite promising. This research has 
allowed us to uncover a distinctive web of managerial communication practices which can 
be traced to the cultural context, political ideology, and organizational structure of state-
owned Chinese factories in the early 1990s. Through our use of semistructured interviews 
we were able to create a relaxed, informal atmosphere. Both the interpreter and the native 
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Chinese interviewer expressed surprise at how candid the managers were in many of their 
responses. The managers may have felt much freer to express their real views away from 
lifelong co-workers, and out of earshot of the Party. Also, managers who experienced the 
Cultural Revolution of the late ’60s and early ’70s may be less worried now about being 
held to their views at a later date or criticized for them. 
Even though our results are preliminary, closely tied to context and to our particular 
sample of managers, they do suggest some possible lines of further investigation. That 
these managers seek reasons underlying misbehavior and enlist the assistance of co-workers 
and family members when confronting problem workers warrants further investigation. 
U.S. research on interpersonal influence in organizations traditionally has focused on pat-
terns of dyadic influence and largely ignored the possibility that influence attempts span 
organizational and family boundaries and may include the use of intermediaries. Cur-
rently, we are examining Chinese managers’ written reports of what they say and do when 
confronting a problem worker. Studying persuasive strategies among Chinese managers 
will permit comparisons with existing research on strategy use among other eastern and 
western managers (Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986) and perhaps lead to more culturally sen-
sitive explanations of strategic communication behavior in organizations (Limaye & Vic-
tor, 1991).  
Second, in an attempt to better understand the social climate and culture of Chinese 
factories we are examining the kinds of positive and negative emotional events that man-
agers experience and their communicative responses in these situations. Describing the 
types of events that cause pleasant and unpleasant feelings can reveal systems of rights 
and obligations as they function in these factories (Harre, 1986). By examining what man-
agers say and avoid saying in these situations, we will better understand the social and 
personal consequences of conforming to or violating behavioral “rules” in the factories. 
Once made explicit, this knowledge can be compared to the emotional experience of man-
agers from other cultures to better understand that which is universally true about man-
agement communication and that which is unique to a particular national culture (Limaye 
& Victor, 1991). 
A third area of research that these interviews suggest is the nature and meaning of for-
mal and informal communication networks in Chinese organizations. To distinguish 
among and compare these types of communication networks in U.S. organizations is rela-
tively straightforward. However, given at least some pressure to express ideologically cor-
rect positions in China, and the fact that other workers and party members can turn one in 
for failing to express the correct point of view, the differences in formal and informal com-
munication networks may be few, but this remains to be determined. As was mentioned 
previously, the close interdependence and continuity between work and personal life 
raises interesting questions related to overlapping social influence and conflict processes 
in China. 
Besides being an interesting subject in its own right, increased knowledge about mana-
gerial communication in China also can help reveal some of the cultural assumptions un-
derlying communication practices in U.S. business organizations. The inevitable gap 
between ideals and practice aside, we found the Chinese custom of associating “moral 
character” with effective organizational behavior and leadership intriguing since some 
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have suggested that modern U.S. organizations suffer from inattention to matters of ethical 
conduct (e.g., W. C. Redding, 1990). Also, we were struck by the Chinese managerial prac-
tice of attending to the entire person of the worker. While such “total inclusion” is, of 
course, a strategy with both opportunities and threats, it contrasts sharply with the as-
sumption of “partial inclusion” so common in U.S. organizations. That organizations could 
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